Sovereign Vault

Sovereign Vault

A local-only encrypted vault for the files you'd rather not leave sitting in plaintext. No cloud, no account, no subscription.

AES-256-GCM ARGON2ID LOCAL-ONLY STORAGE

How it locks

Everything in the vault is encrypted under a single 256-bit Vault Master Key, generated once and never written to disk in the clear — it exists only in memory for the duration of an unlocked session. That key is unlocked two independent ways: a daily PIN, combined with a secret bound to this specific device, or a master password that stands alone as a recovery route. Either path produces the same key; neither one by itself is enough to reconstruct it.

Argon2id Argon2id SHA-256 combine unwraps unwraps AES-256-GCM encrypts PIN Master Password Device Secret never leaves this machine PIN-Derived Key Master-Derived Key Combined Key VAULT MASTER KEY 256-bit · memory-only Vault Index + Documents ciphertext on disk
Two independent paths unwrap the same vault master key: the daily-use PIN path combines a PIN with a secret bound to this device, while the master-password path stands alone as a recovery route. Either one produces the same 256-bit key, which then encrypts everything else with AES-256-GCM.

The vault defends itself

Ten wrong PIN attempts in a row triggers a 24-hour lockout. Ten more triggers 72 hours. A third exhaustion doesn't lock the vault again — it destroys the keys. "Destroys" means deleting the handful of small key-material entries in secure storage, not overwriting the whole disk: without those few kilobytes, the ciphertext left behind is permanently unreadable, by anyone, including us. Authenticating with the master password clears an active lockout immediately, so a legitimate owner who triggers their own lockout isn't stuck waiting it out.

What it actually defends against

ScenarioOutcome
Laptop is lost, stolen, or accessed by someone without your PIN or master passwordDefended
Vault files copied to another machine or a USB driveDefended
Repeated PIN guesses through the app's own unlock screenDefended
Someone who already knows your PIN or master passwordNot defended
Malware already running on your unlocked sessionNot defended

Full technical detail — Argon2id parameters, the physical-portability model, and the one known hardening gap we're tracking (a software-enforced lockout counter, not yet TPM-anchored) — is written up in the security architecture document.

Sealed sharing

A vault can be packaged into a single encrypted file — a random, meaningless name, sealed with a 6-digit PIN — and sent anywhere: email, cloud storage, a USB stick. Whatever carries it only ever sees ciphertext. Share the PIN a different way, over a call or a text, and it stays useless to anyone who only intercepted one of the two.

The person on the other end doesn't need to own Sovereign Vault. Sovereign Vault Opener is a free companion app: enter the PIN, choose a folder, done — no account, no purchase.

Download Sovereign Vault Opener — macOS, free

Privacy Policy

Effective date: 2026

Sovereign Vault collects no personal data, in any form, ever — this isn't a policy choice sitting on top of the app, it's a consequence of how it's built.

If this policy changes, the update will be posted at this same URL with a new effective date.

Support

Most questions answer themselves:

Anything else — a bug, a crash, a question this page doesn't cover: mnemomemory@proton.me

End User License Agreement

Effective date: 2026

This is a license, not a sale. Aurora Apps grants you a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable license to use Sovereign Vault on devices you own or control, subject to Apple's Licensed Application End User License Agreement and the terms below.

Questions about this agreement: mnemomemory@proton.me

Coming to macOS